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Abstract
In his Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Schefﬂer provides a compelling argument that people
would see less reason and be signiﬁcantly less motivated to pursue most of their life’s projects
if they were to discover that there is no collective afterlife (i.e. future generations of humans con-
tinuing to exist after they die). Schefﬂer focuses on how people would react to learning there is
no collective afterlife. In this paper, I focus on issues concerning how people ought to react to
learning there is no collective afterlife. Answers to this question lead to surprising conclusions
that challenge some of the normative claims Schefﬂer seems disposed to endorse. This paper
has two central aims. First, I attempt to show that negative attitudes toward the lack of a collec-
tive afterlife are warranted for two reasons that have been heretofore overlooked. Interestingly,
such reasons leave open the possibility that it can be appropriate to lament the lack of a collective
afterlife even if it is not bad, all things considered, for anyone. Second, I argue that the lack of a
collective afterlife need not be bad, all things considered, for most people. This is because there
could be a sufﬁcient number of meaningful projects available to people that would compensate
for the loss of pro tanto value caused by the lack of a collective afterlife. These considerations
lead to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the lack of a collective afterlife need not neg-
atively affect the total value of anyone’s life, yet it may still be appropriate to lament the fact that
there is no collective afterlife.
1. Introduction
Samuel Schefﬂer’s Death and the Afterlife contains a fascinating exploration of
the relationship between the value in our life and the existence of the collective af-
terlife (i.e. future generations of humans continuing to exist after we die). After
imagining that the collective afterlife is prevented by a doomsday scenario or by
sudden human infertility, Schefﬂer argues that people would react with horror
and dread to such revelations. Each case is set up so that one gets to live out the
remainder of her natural life, but the collective afterlife ceases to exist soon
thereafter (Schefﬂer 2013, 19, 38). In such cases, people would supposedly see
less reason and be signiﬁcantly less motivated to pursue most of their life’s pro-
jects (e.g. ﬁnding a cure for cancer, creating art, engaging in political activism)
or even follow through on everyday plans (Schefﬂer 2013, 23). They would no
longer believe such activities, and by extension their life, to be worthwhile. Or,
at least, they would believe such activities to be signiﬁcantly less worthwhile than
if there were an extensive collective afterlife.
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These Doomsday and Infertility thought experiments raise a few distinct, but
closely related, questions. First, how would people react to learning that there is
no collective afterlife? Second, how ought people to react to learning that there
is no collective afterlife? Schefﬂer focuses primarily on how people would gener-
ally react to such scenarios, though people’s imagined responses are presumed to
be, for the most part, apt. In this paper, I focus on issues concerning the second of
these two questions and do so with respect to individuals’ well-being. It may be
true that they would react in the way Schefﬂer suggests, but should they? Surpris-
ingly, I think the answer is often ‘No.’ My arguments may be seen to challenge
some of the normative claims Schefﬂer seems disposed to endorse. However,
my principal aim is not to tear down, but to build upon, this new area of
philosophical inquiry. The conclusions I reach are quite different from, but largely
consistent with, Schefﬂer’s. My hope is that they will further our understanding of
the relationship between the value1 in our lives and the collective afterlife.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I review Schefﬂer’s Dooms-
day and Infertility thought experiments and the conclusions he draws from them in
a bit more detail. While doing so, I argue that one kind of reaction Schefﬂer claims
people would have is irrational. In the third section, I argue that negative attitudes2
toward the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios are warranted for two reasons that
have been heretofore overlooked by Schefﬂer and his commentators. Interestingly,
such reasons leave open the possibility that it can be appropriate to lament the lack
of a collective afterlife even if it is not bad, all things considered, for anyone. In
the fourth section, I suggest that most people are not primarily engaged in projects
that would be signiﬁcantly affected by the lack of a collective afterlife. I then ar-
gue that the degree to which the lack of a collective afterlife does negatively affect
the meaningfulness of people’s lives (and their total well-being) could be compen-
sated for if people engaged in other, comparably meaningful, projects which could
be pursued in the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios. These considerations lead us
to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the lack of a collective afterlife need
not negatively affect anyone’s total well-being nor make anyone’s life less
1 For the purposes of this paper, when I discuss the value in one’s life, I am referring to the
total well-being and meaningfulness contained in one’s life. The relationship between well-being and
meaningfulness is a complicated one and I do not take a stand on the correct way to understand it in
this paper.
2 There is a variety of different negative attitudes one may have towards the lack of a collec-
tive afterlife: fear, sadness, dread, worry, depression, angst, despair, melancholy, dismay, and so on.
Attempting to determine which negative attitudes are warranted by the lack of a collective afterlife, un-
der what conditions, is beyond the scope of this paper. For simplicity’s sake, I will simply speak of neg-
ative attitudes at a general level and use the term lament as a catchall for non-trivial negative attitudes. I
employ the same strategy in my (2016) and (2018).
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meaningful than they believed it to be. Yet it may still be appropriate to lament the
fact that there is no collective afterlife.
2. The Doomsday and Infertility scenarios
2.1. Two thought experiments
I will now provide a brief exposition of the Doomsday and Infertility thought ex-
periments, as well as the broad conclusions Schefﬂer draws from them. In order to
disambiguate certain conclusions I will draw from these thought experiments, I
also ﬁll in some important details on Schefﬂer’s behalf. Let’s consider the Dooms-
day scenario ﬁrst.
The Doomsday Scenario: A giant asteroid is going to strike the earth thirty days af-
ter you die your natural death. As a consequence, we may suppose, all life on earth
will be permanently destroyed by the asteroid (2013, 18).
Schefﬂer’s description of this thought experiment is not very detailed. Does ev-
eryone know that their lives will be ended prematurely by an asteroid? If so, how
do they respond to such news? For those who get to live out their natural lives,
will any of their loved ones die prematurely? Answers to these questions affect
the way in which people would (and ought to) respond to such news and the
way in which the Doomsday scenario affects your life. To consider an extreme ex-
ample, suppose that after learning of their imminent premature death, almost ev-
eryone stops going to work and the economy collapses. Soon after it becomes
exceedingly difﬁcult to procure the basic necessities of life, which forces people
to act violently to survive. This outcome would clearly be bad for you and every-
one else, who would suffer as a consequence of the economic collapse. This much
is obvious and, as such, philosophically uninteresting. To focus on the substantive
philosophical issues, let’s suppose that in the Doomsday scenario, the world does
not descend into a post-apocalyptic nightmare. People would still tend to fulﬁll
their moral obligations, do what is in their prudential interest, and react appropri-
ately (whatever that amounts to) to learning there is no collective afterlife.
How ought you to respond to learning that you’re in the Doomsday scenario?
Clearly, theDoomsday scenario is bad for the people whose lives are ended prema-
turely by the asteroid. But, we might wonder whether the Doomsday scenario is
bad for you and if so, whether it is intrinsically or extrinsically bad. We also might
wonder whether it is pro tanto bad or all things considered bad or both. Relatedly,
we might wonder whether the Doomsday scenario would make the projects you
pursue, and by extension your life, less meaningful. Schefﬂer recognizes that
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answering these questions may be made difﬁcult by certain features of the Dooms-
day scenario. The fact that it would be bad for many people we deeply care about
might make it difﬁcult to disentangle our judgments about how our lives are af-
fected from judgments about how others’ lives are affected. It may then sometimes
be difﬁcult to tell which features of the thought experiment our reactive attitudes
are tracking. To help deal with these complications, Schefﬂer also imagines the In-
fertility scenario, drawn from the novel and ﬁlm Children of Men.
The Infertility Scenario: Everyone is inexplicably and instantaneously rendered in-
fertile. Although they suffer no adverse health effects, they are unable to reproduce.
Each person will live out their natural life, but no future generations will come into
existence (2013, 38).
Since no one dies prematurely as a consequence of the Infertility scenario, we
can imagine that everyone is aware that humankind is infertile and that there is
no collective afterlife. To keep the Infertility scenario relevantly similar to the
Doomsday scenario, let us also assume that earth will be permanently devoid of
all sentient life once the last human dies. The Infertility scenario raises interesting
questions in its own right. How should people who identify as prospective parents
react? They will be deprived of an experiential ‘good’ that those in the Doomsday
scenario are not. Is the Infertility scenario necessarily bad, all things considered,
for anyone? Each existing person gets to live out their natural life, while only
merely (metaphysically) possible persons are deprived of a good life. How should
those in the Infertility scenario feel if it is not bad, all things considered, for any-
one? Could it still be appropriate to have negative attitudes toward the lack of a
collective afterlife? I will return to these questions in the next two sections. Before
I do that, however, I am going to brieﬂy review the conclusions Schefﬂer draws
from his thought experiments.
2.2. Schefﬂer’s conclusions
Schefﬂer ﬁrst writes that the (relatively nearby) “imminent disappearance of hu-
man life would be sufﬁcient for us to react with horror even if it would not involve
the premature death of any of our loved ones” (2013, 23).3 The central lesson
3 Schefﬂer also suggests that this, in itself, supports a nonexperientialist interpretation of value
(2013, 20). But that seems too quick a conclusion to draw for two reasons. First, both scenarios could
affect our present experiences, which may ground our negative attitudes. Second, as I will argue, one
may hold that the only goods are experiential, yet respond negatively to the Infertility scenario because
the world contains less good than one (justiﬁably) believed. This attitude, which is perfectly consistent
with a purely experiential account of value, could explain our presumed reactions of horror to the lack
of the collective afterlife.
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Schefﬂer draws from these cases is that if people were to discover that there is no
collective afterlife, they would believe that their projects (and their lives) conse-
quently matter less than they believed.4 Additionally, they would also believe that
the lack of a collective afterlife reduces the total well-being of people who ﬁnd
themselves in the Doomsday or Infertility scenario.
To help see why, consider one of Schefﬂer’s oft-cited examples. Those engaged
in cancer research would be signiﬁcantly less motivated to continue their work if
they were to discover that life on earth was ending in the (relatively) near future
(2013, 24–27). One reason why is immediately clear. The primary expected ben-
eﬁciaries of cancer research are future generations of people, not necessarily those
who currently exist. In fact, countless projects are primarily aimed at beneﬁting
people who do not yet exist. I will refer to all such projects as future-oriented pro-
jects. The primary, if not sole, reason people have to cure disease is to prevent un-
necessary suffering and to extend lives that are worth living. So, the actual value
of engaging in cancer research in the Doomsday scenario is signiﬁcantly less than
the expected value since the lack of a collective afterlife prevents there from being
any beneﬁciaries of such research. Generalizing from this example, we can see
that the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios would signiﬁcantly undermine the rea-
sons people have to pursue future-oriented projects.5 Schefﬂer’s discussion of the
example reveals that he takes people to accept the following principle.
Meaningful Projects (MP): The degree to which a project is meaningful is at least
partly determined by the extent to which it beneﬁts morally considerable beings.6
MP should seem pretty uncontroversial. It includes the qualiﬁer ‘partly’ to
allow that other features of a project can contribute to their meaningfulness. Per-
haps, ceteris paribus, helping someone you love makes a project more meaning-
ful. It could be that the uniqueness of a project or the difﬁculty of completing it
contributes to its meaningfulness. Schefﬂer’s imagined reactions also suggest that
people are disposed to believe the following, not implausible, principle.
4 Various reasons why are discussed throughout Schefﬂer’s ﬁrst two lectures. See, especially,
Schefﬂer (2013, Lecture 1, §§3–6).
5 I write ‘signiﬁcantly undermine’ rather than ‘completely eradicate’ to leave open the possi-
bility that projects such as engaging in cancer research are intrinsically valuable. This could be because
such work is inherently difﬁcult and making any progress in the ﬁeld requires a great deal of ingenuity
gained from years of highly specialized research. See Frankfurt (2013, 134).
6 PerhapsMP needs to be restricted to rule out the possibility that a project can be meaningful
if it beneﬁts people that deserve to be harmed or, more generally, requires performing immoral acts. I
remain neutral on this question for the purposes of my argument.
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Well-Being and Meaning (WAM): Ceteris paribus, one’s total well-being is increased
by engaging in meaningful projects.
WAM is certainly controversial and Schefﬂer does not explicitly take a stand on
its truth in his (2013). I will likewise not take a stand on its truth in this paper, but I
will include it as a viable option in my discussion.
The lack of a collective afterlife certainly undermines the value of future-ori-
ented projects, but most people do not seem to be primarily engaged in many fu-
ture-oriented projects. A few common future-oriented projects notwithstanding,
people tend to select careers, hobbies, and goals with the explicit aim of affecting
existing people more often than not. I will refer to projects with this as their
primary aim as present-oriented projects.7 Interestingly, Schefﬂer suggests that
people would also think that present-oriented projects are rendered signiﬁcantly
less valuable by the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios.8 To understand why, it
will be helpful to ﬁrst consider an example.
Playwright: A genius playwright is working on her latest masterpiece when she
learns that there is no collective afterlife. She realizes that shortly after she dies
her natural death, there will be no one to read, write, act in or even appreciate a play
ever again.
Now, if Schefﬂer’s speculations are correct, this writer would believe that the
act of ﬁnishing her play is made signiﬁcantly less valuable by a Doomsday or In-
fertility scenario. She might even lose her motivation to complete the project after
she learns that there is no collective afterlife.
Furthermore, this imagined artist’s reaction is presumed to be ﬁtting. The reason
why, Schefﬂer contends, is because most people think there is value in continuing
to engage in distinctively human projects that reﬂect human values (Schefﬂer 2013,
Lecture 1, §5).9 There is supposed value in carrying on a tradition and, likewise, in
pursuing a project that is part of a tradition that will be carried on.10 This idea is
7 Present- and future-oriented projects are each a bit of a misnomer since people may engage
in projects aimed at helping people in the future who currently exist. Such projects count as present-ori-
ented projects, as I use the phrase. These are not mutually exclusive categories either. Some projects
may be both present- and future-oriented.
8 Numerous reasons why are discussed throughout Schefﬂer’s ﬁrst two lectures. See, espe-
cially, Schefﬂer (2013, Lecture 1, §§ 8–9).
9 Schefﬂer makes an argument for this view in his (2012, ch. 11).
10 Schefﬂer further distinguishes between group-based and tradition-based projects. See
Schefﬂer (2013, Lecture 1, §§5 and 6). The former aims to preserve the existence of a certain group
in the afterlife that one ﬁnds valuable, while the latter aims to preserve a tradition in the afterlife that
one ﬁnds valuable. I don’t further discuss this distinction in the paper since nothing, for the purposes
of my argument, hangs on it.
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eloquently captured when Schefﬂer writes that “participating in traditions that em-
body the values to which [the participants] are committed, individuals can leverage
their own personal efforts to ensure the survival of those values” (Schefﬂer 2013,
33). Since the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios prevent the survival of such
values, all such projects lose what Schefﬂer refers to as their conservative dimen-
sion and would consequently be regarded as less valuable.11 This is important to
note because the loss of the conservative dimension of value can even apply to
present-oriented projects. Although such projects have the explicit aim of helping
existing people, they are undertaken with the implicit assumption that there will be
a collective afterlife in the evaluative background.12 The lack of a collective
afterlife can supposedly therefore reduce the value of such present-oriented
projects. We can state Schefﬂer’s idea in terms of the following principle.
Conservative Meaningful Projects (CMP): The degree to which a project is meaning-
ful is at least partly determined by the extent to which it is conservative in Schefﬂer’s
sense.13
Finally, Schefﬂer also entertains the possibility that the perceived value of im-
mediately gratifying goods would also be negatively affected. Drawing from P.D.
James’s (the author of Children of Men) predictions, Schefﬂer suggests that the In-
fertility scenario would cause people to fail to see the value in “such things as the
enjoyment of nature; the appreciation of literature, music, and the visual arts,” as
well as the “appetitive pleasures of food, drink, and sex” (2013, 42). More pre-
cisely, Schefﬂer is suggesting that just the lack of a collective afterlife would,
11 Schefﬂer also suggests that there is a non-consequentialist dimension to our imagined reac-
tions (p. 20). The fact that we would supposedly react negatively to learning there is no collective af-
terlife without ﬁrst trying to calculate the net value of this consequence is supposed to indicate that what
we value is not solely a matter of the best consequences. I do not discuss this further in the paper for
two reasons. First, I am skeptical that this is any evidence of a non-consequentialist dimension of value.
People may implicitly assume that the net value of life would be positive were it to continue despite the
fact that this is far from obvious. See Parﬁt (2011, Volume II, ch. 36) for more on this issue. More im-
portantly, consequentialists need not think that our reactions to various outcomes should only track the
overall goodness of the consequences. The best outcome may still be intrinsically bad or comparatively
bad to other metaphysically possible outcomes. This in itself can warrant negative attitudes. So, I sus-
pect that even dyed-in-the-wool consequentialists would immediately have a negative reaction to learn-
ing that there is no collective afterlife. The only exceptions might be consequentialists who are also
anti-natalists. See Benatar (2006, 2017, ch. 4). Anti-natalism is a viable position that merits serious dis-
cussion, but that discussion extends beyond the scope of this paper. Since Schefﬂer appears to assume
that anti-natalism is false, I will proceed under that assumption for the purposes of this paper. Second, it
is worth noting that the positions I defend in this paper are consistent with there being a non-consequen-
tialist dimension of value.
12 I thank an anonymous referee for helping me see this point and for articulating it so clearly.
13 This principle is drawn from Schefﬂer (2013, 22).
Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad 281
© 2018 The Author dialectica © 2018 Editorial Board of dialectica
by most people’s lights, signiﬁcantly reduce (though it needn’t completely
eradicate) the value of goods that tend to be immediately gratifying.
2.3. An objection
I grant that people might believe that the lack of a collective afterlife, in itself, can
render a present-oriented project less meaningful, but I am skeptical that this is an
appropriate reaction. The following case should help illustrate why.
Ice Sculpture: Alice the artist is hired to carve a grandiose ice sculpture for a one
night only art exhibit. The ice sculpture will completely melt by dawn the next
day. It will only be seen and appreciated by those who attend the night of the exhibit.
The attendees will not be discussing the art with anyone else. No video or photos
will be permitted. Alice knows this prior to starting her art project and does not ex-
pect her ice sculpture to make any impact on the art world beyond those who see her
sculpture the night in question.
Now, suppose that Alice discovers she is in an Infertility scenario while
sculpting. If Schefﬂer’s speculations are accurate, Alice would be inclined to think
her project is less valuable (though not completely valueless nor pointless) than
she originally believed because, for instance, the tradition of sculpting will not
be carried on after she dies. This is so in spite of the fact that the ice sculpture
would be appreciated by the exact same people, in the exact same way, and to
the exact same degree as Alice initially believed. I am not sure if people would re-
act as Alice is imagined to, but such a reaction seems to me to be misguided. Nev-
ertheless, since this is a matter of intuition over which reasonable people disagree,
I will also include CMP as a viable option in my discussion.
To sum up Schefﬂer’s grim speculations in his own words, the Doomsday and
Infertility scenarios would be “characterized by widespread apathy, anomie, and
despair; by the erosion of social institutions and social solidarity; by the deteriora-
tion of the physical environment; and by a pervasive loss of conviction about the
value or point of many activities” (2013, 40). In section 4, I hope to provide rea-
son to think that our response to the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios ought not
be so bleak.
3. Overlooked warranted negative attitudes
Before I defend the comparatively optimistic component of my view, I want to add
to Schefﬂer’s grim speculations. There are a few signiﬁcant kinds of reason to la-
ment the lack of a collective afterlife, which are overlooked by Schefﬂer and his
commentators. Interestingly, these reasons warrant non-trivial negative attitudes
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toward the lack of a collective afterlife irrespective of whether any morally consid-
erable being is made worse off by the Doomsday or Infertility scenario. The up-
shot of this section is twofold. First, if my arguments succeed, they will reveal
two surprising features of the relationship between appropriate attitudes and the
lack of a collective afterlife. Second, it should help to further clarify which fea-
tures of the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios our responses are tracking, as well
as which features they ought to be tracking.
3.1. Impartial considerations
One striking feature of the Infertility scenario is that it is not clear that it is all
things considered bad for anyone (or that it will necessarily makes anyone’s life
less valuable). I will argue that the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios warrant
some non-trivial negative attitudes for both partial and impartial reasons. First,
consider the impartial reasons. The Doomsday and Infertility scenarios would en-
tail that
(1) The world is signiﬁcantly less good from the point of view of the universe
than we reasonably expected.14
Henry Sidgwick coined the idiom from the point of view of the universe, which,
generally put, picks out an impartial evaluative stance (Sidgwick 1907, 382).
More precisely, it involves seeing “everything from the outside, including myself
and whatever moral or other dispositions, affections or projects, I may have; and
from that outside view,” assigning them a value. When I take up the point of view
of the universe, I don’t imagine myself as any particular person in any particular
world, but instead consider how good the world is from the outside, so to speak.
The vast majority of people justiﬁably believe that life on earth will continue
for hundreds of millions of years. Assuming most believe that the net value of
the world is and will remain positive, most people believe that our world’s future
is going to contain a practically incomprehensible amount of additional good.
Were they to discover that there is no collective afterlife, they would learn that
the actual world is vastly less good, from the perspective of the universe, than they
expected. This, in itself, warrants negative attitudes; not necessarily because the
lack of a collective afterlife is bad for any person, but simply in virtue of the fact
that the world is less good than one reasonably expected. This should already
seem plausible as an axiom, but the following analogue scenario may further mo-
tivate this claim.
14 Schefﬂer recognizes this may be partly responsible for people’s negative reactions to the
Doomsday scenario (Schefﬂer 2013, 20–21). Michael Cholbi suggests that this may help justify peo-
ple’s negative reactions to the Doomsday scenario (Cholbi, 2015, 209).
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Prospective Alien Life: There is overwhelming evidence that another planet (Planet
X) will start to be inhabited by sentient life in the year 2030, which will thrive for
hundreds of millions of years. We have decisive reason to believe that although
the humanoid beings that will supposedly inhabit Planet X will not share our history,
non-moral values or general way of life, they will be comparably intelligent and will
live lives that are as good as ours. However, in 2030 we ﬁnd out that Planet X
formed near a black hole that will destroy it right before sentient life would have
emerged. Consequently, contrary to what we justiﬁably believed, there will never
be sentient life on Planet X.
What is the appropriate way to respond to such news? Clearly no one should be
happy. Nor do I think anyone should be callously indifferent to this revelation.
Rather, some non-trivial negative attitude seems appropriate. This is so even if
is not bad for any existing person that there will be no such intelligent life. Gen-
eralizing from this case, we get the following principle.
The Impartial Expectation Principle (IEP): The degree to which it is appropriate for
person P to have a negative attitude toward an actual outcome Oa at time t is partly
determined by the extent to which Oa is worse, from the point of view of the uni-
verse, than the outcome P justiﬁably expected Oe prior to t.
IEP is a relatively modest principle. It includes the qualiﬁer ‘partly,’ so that it
may be supplemented with other principles about appropriate attitudes. It does
not take a stand on the appropriate strength of the negative attitudes it warrants.
It is neutral with respect to the correct axiology and so is ﬂexible. Finally, it does
not take a stand on whether the disparity between the actual and possible goodness
of the world can warrant negative attitudes. It only posits a link between actual
goodness and one’s justiﬁed expectations of goodness.15
Although IEP is a modest principle, it yields substantive, interesting conclu-
sions. For one, negative reactions to the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios should
be, in part, the product of concerns that have nothing to do with how the lack of a
collective afterlife affects the value of one’s life. Appropriate negative reactions
should be, in one sense, purely selﬂess.16
15 This should avoid the worries Kai Draper raises (Draper 1999, 2013) and accommodate Jeff
McMahan’s insights (McMahan 2002, ch. 2, §§3–5). That is, IEP does not entail that we should lament
the lack of goods we cannot reasonably expect (e.g. Aladdin’s Lamp). It is also consistent with the pos-
itive account Bradley defends (Bradley 2015).
16 Schefﬂer does write that our perceived dependence on the collective afterlife reveals the
limits of our egoism. But he is not suggesting that such concerns are selﬂess and his use of the term
egoism seems non-standard (2013, 181). Kolodny (2013) and Frankfurt (2013) both suggest that
Schefﬂer’s view, if accurate, reveals concerns that are particularly egoistic (in a standard sense) rather
than altruistic.
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Another notable consequence of IEP is that it entails that one’s attitudes should
not simply track possible goods that are distinctively human. Schefﬂer suggests that
the fact that distinctively human values, traditions and communities would be erad-
icated in theDoomsday and Infertility scenarios would be largely responsible for our
reactions of horror. That may be, though there is more that should be informing our
attitudes if IEP is true. The net loss of reasonably expected good of any kindwarrants
some kind of negative attitude. With respect to the Doomsday and Infertility scenar-
ios, the impartial negative attitudes you ought to have should be comparable to the
impartial negative attitudes you ought to have in response to Prospective Alien Life.
Perhaps the most interesting consequence of IEP is that it allows that it may be
appropriate to have non-trivial negative attitudes to theDoomsday and Infertility sce-
narios even if the lack of the collective afterlife is good for every being with moral
status. It is possible that all beings with moral status could be made better off by
the Infertility scenario and yet, everyone may be warranted in lamenting this
outcome because the Infertility scenario could simultaneously make the world vastly
worse off from the point of view of the universe. Interestingly, an analogue issue also
arises with respect to the purely self-regarding reasons we have to respond
negatively to the lack of a collective afterlife. It is to that topic that I now turn.
3.2. Partial considerations
At ﬁrst glance, understanding which self-regarding reasons we have to be concerned
with the collective afterlife might seem relatively straightforward. Most would be
inclined to accept the following principle, which seems practically indubitable.
The Meaning and Well-Being Principle (MAWP): The degree to which it is appropri-
ate for person P to have a negative attitude, for self-regarding reasons, toward
outcome O is partly determined by the extent to which P is made worse off (and/
or P’s life is made less meaningful) by O.
Schefﬂer seems disposed to accept a principle likeMAWP and its appeal is quite
evident. It has a good deal of explanatory power. For instance, it could explain why it
seems appropriate for a cancer researcher to react with horror were she to discover
that she is in the Doomsday scenario. Her life thus far would have been much more
meaningful if the asteroid were going to miss the earth. MAWP could also explain
why someone who only wants to be a father should lament discovering that he is
in the Infertility scenario (assuming he would be better off if he had a child). In short,
(given MP, CMP, and WAM) MAWP seems to capture the reasons why Schefﬂer
imagines that people would react with horror to theDoomsday and Infertility scenar-
ios. The lack of the collective afterlife is supposed to be regarded as bad for existing
persons and, relatedly, makes their lives less meaningful.
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Susan Wolf (2013) and Harry Frankfurt (2013) both argue that doomsday sce-
narios wouldn’t be as bad as Schefﬂer imagines and they do so within the conﬁnes
ofMAWP. I am going to do something different, not by arguing againstMAWP, but
by arguing that it is not the entire picture. It is also true that one can have self-re-
garding reasons to lament the lack of a collective afterlife even if one is not made
worse off (and one’s life is not made less meaningful) by the Doomsday or Infertil-
ity scenario. This conclusion is important in its own right. But if my arguments in
the next section are successful, it is also crucial to preserving our initial judgments
about the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios. This is because the lack of a collec-
tive afterlife need not be bad, all things considered, for anyone. At the same time,
some degree of lament may still be an appropriate response to the Doomsday and
Infertility scenarios for the following heretofore overlooked reason.
(2) Doomsday and Infertility scenarios undermine people’s justiﬁed beliefs
about the types of goods they reasonably expect in their life.
To be clear, it is not always bad to have one’s beliefs about expected goods
undermined. Imagine, for instance, that one is indifferent between the receipt of
two different types of goods (A and B) and desires each of them equally for similar
reasons, yet only expects to receive A. To this person’s surprise, she receives B
instead of A. I will stipulate that this person has made no arrangements for the
receipt of either good, is indifferent to which one she receives, and the receipt of
either good will not affect her in any signiﬁcant way. Maybe A is attending a
performance of Tchaikovsky’s Pathétique symphony and B is watching Three
Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri. In this case, it seems that expecting A, but
receiving B, warrants no negative attitudes.
What is interesting, however, is that the details can also be ﬁlled in such that
expecting A, but receiving B does warrant non-trivial negative attitudes, even if
A and B are equally good for everyone affected by the good in question.17 This
will be true in cases in which one’s life has been shaped in important ways by
the expectation of said good or the receipt of the type(s) of good in question is im-
portant to the agent’s thick, as opposed to thin, self. The distinction between thick
and thin selves has usually been invoked to discuss the supposedly relevant asym-
metry between the ways in which it is possible for us to have been born earlier
than we were and to die later than we will.18 But this distinction will also be useful
in thinking about how (2) sometimes warrants negative attitudes. The thin notion
17 Or, for that matter, even if B is to a certain extent better than A.
18 This argument can be originally attributed to Thomas Nagel (1979), although John Martin
Fischer and Frederik Kaufman have probably done the most to develop it. John Martin Fischer notably
makes use of this distinction in his (2009). For criticisms of this move, see Johansson (2013) and for a
response, see Fischer and Brueckner (2014).
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of personhood is constituted by one’s metaphysical essence (e.g. one’s body, ge-
netic makeup, mind, soul) or whatever is essential for cross-world identity (Kauf-
man 2000, 95). The thick person is determined by (a) the thin person and (b) the
thin person’s history determined by all of the contingent matters of fact of the
world in question (e.g. memories, desires, beliefs, values, and personality traits).19
Now, the Infertility scenario would undermine a large set of justiﬁed beliefs
most people have about certain types of goods they can expect in their life and,
crucially, it would undermine beliefs about expected goods that are centrally im-
portant to such persons’ current thick selves. The expectation of such goods will
even inform a plethora of signiﬁcant life-altering decisions made by such people.
This subversion would result in outcomes that are intrinsically bad (e.g. pain) for
these people even if it doesn’t make any of them, on the whole, worse off.20 Let’s
consider the clearest example of the phenomena I have in mind. Prior to the mo-
ment everyone becomes infertile, people justiﬁably believe that they may have
children. Moreover, most people want to have children and plenty of people desire
to have children so much that it is a central part of their identity. They plan their
lives around this desire. They may forgo job opportunities, refrain from using their
money to improve their quality of life, and likely let their desire for children in-
form their choices about where they live, what careers they pursue, who their ro-
mantic partners are, and so on. In the Infertility scenario, these sacriﬁces were
unnecessary and the preparations for child rearing were made in vain.
Many people would, understandably, suffer immensely were they to learn that
they were in the Infertility scenario because they expected to receive certain goods
that were central to their current thick selves’ identity. It would also force them to
make quick radical changes to their thick selves (that they do not currently want to
make) if they are going to prevent a net decrease in the value of their life. This will
be true for most people, at some level, not just those who strongly desired to be
(and identiﬁed as prospective) parents. Anyone who expected to receive goods
that were dependent upon future generations would be so affected. School
teachers, youth sports coaches, pediatricians, children’s entertainers, day care
workers, and child psychologists would all be negatively affected. The list goes
on. Now, negative attitudes in response to the subversion of the expectations of
such goods seems perfectly appropriate, even if people are not made worse off
(and even if they are made better off), all things considered, in the Infertility sce-
nario.21 To further motivate this claim, consider Jeff McMahan’s The Cure.
19 This is drawn from Fischer and Speak (2000, 85).
20 The intrinsic badness may take the form of thwarted desires or states of emotional pain or
something else, depending on one’s favored axiology.
21 This may be because we have what Elizabeth Harman (2011) refers to as, “reasonable at-
tachment to the actual”.
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The Cure: Imagine that you are twenty years old and are diagnosed with a disease
that, if untreated, invariably causes death … within ﬁve years. There is a treatment
that reliably cures the disease but also, as a side effect, causes total retrograde amnesia
and radical personality change. Long-term studies of others who have had the treat-
ment show that they almost always go on to have long and happy lives, though these
lives are informed by desires and values that differ profoundly from those that the per-
son had prior to treatment. You can therefore reasonably expect that, if you take the
treatment, you will live for roughly sixty more years, though the life you will have
will be utterly discontinuous with your life as it has been. You will remember nothing
of your past and your character and values will be radically altered. Suppose, how-
ever, that this can be reliably predicted: that the future you would have between the
ages of twenty and eighty if you were to take the treatment would, by itself, be better,
as a whole, than your entire life will be if you do not take the treatment (2002, 77).22
Setting aside the question of whether it is in your prudential interest to take the
cure,23 it seems quite plausible that you are warranted in having negative attitudes
about the prospect of taking the cure even though the extra sixty years of life you
gain would be better than the life you have lived thus far. Such negative attitudes
are warranted, at least in part, because you will be unable to obtain goods you rea-
sonably expected to obtain which matter to your current thick self. These goods
would not be replaced by goods that are even comparably important to your cur-
rent thick self, though they may be centrally important to your future thick self.
What is more, any preparations or sacriﬁces you made for such expected goods
were made in vain. These considerations suggest that we can pick out the in-
stances of (2) that warrant negative attitudes with the following principle.
The Partial Expectation Principle (PEP): The degree to which it is appropriate for
person P to have a negative attitude, for self-regarding reasons, toward some out-
come O is partly determined by the extent to which P is deprived of goods that (i)
P was justiﬁed in expecting and (ii) that P’s current thick self desires.24 The more
central the good is to the identity of the agent’s thick self, the greater the degree to
which it is appropriate to have a negative attitude toward O.
PEP should be no more contentious than IEP. It too includes the qualiﬁer
‘partly’ for the same reasons and it too is ﬂexible. It also is neutral with respect
to the question of whether it is in your prudential interest to take the cure. That
22 McMahan stipulates that you survive taking the cure and so is ruling out certain psycholog-
ical accounts of personal identity. To avoid begging any questions, just imagine that your psychology is
altered to the maximum extent possible with you continuing to exist after taking the cure.
23 For a compelling argument that it is in your prudential interest to take the cure, see Bradley
(2008, 2009, §4.2).
24 To be sure, PEP allows that you may look forward to a future where your thick self is rad-
ically different. Your future well-being should be of central importance to your thick self. Assuming
your future thick self does not have values that your current thick self ﬁnds objectionable, you should
look forward to a future where your thick self is well off.
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is, one could accept PEP, but deny that it is in your prudential interest to take the
cure because of the radical change your thick self undergoes. Alternatively, one
could also accept that it is in your prudential interest to take the cure, yet hold that
you should have some non-trivial negative attitudes toward doing what is in your
prudential interest.25
Although PEP is a modest principle, it too yields substantive interesting con-
clusions. For one, your reasons for concern about the existence of the collective
afterlife are self-interested in a rather peculiar way. PEP entails that we should
be concerned with how the lack of a collective afterlife affects your thick self in-
dependent of how it affects the net value of your life. It may still be appropriate to
lament the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios for self-regarding reasons even if
the lack of a collective afterlife does not negatively affect the net value of your
life.
My aims in this section have been relatively modest. I argued for IEP and PEP
and highlighted the surprising implications of each. I then argued that these
principles reveal some heretofore overlooked features of the relationship between
appropriate attitudes and the collective afterlife, as well as help elucidate the kinds
of negative attitudes that the lack of a collective afterlife warrants.
4. Doomsday and Infertility scenarios need not be bad, all things considered
4.1. Vacation Adversity: an analogue scenario
The conclusions I reached in the last section might seem grim. But hopefully not
too grim since, for all I have argued, the lack of the collective afterlife need not be
bad, all things considered, for any morally considerable being. It could even be
good, all things considered, for many of them, which would warrant a non-trivial
positive attitude (at least at some point). At ﬁrst glance these conclusions might
seem to work as a reductio against my view. But they don’t. In fact, I think we
are disposed to make these kinds of judgments in more realistic cases and such
judgments are recognized to be perfectly reasonable. To illustrate, consider the
following case.
Vacation Adversity: The Griswold family has been planning a trip to the Louvre for
years. In preparation, they took numerous art history classes to better appreciate the
25 This is consistent with the argument given in Bradley (2008, 2009). This should also be a
natural move for those persuaded by Harman (2009, 2011). Our reasonable attachment to the actual
can, in certain circumstances, justify having positive attitudes toward outcomes that are not in our pru-
dential interest. Conversely, our reasonable attachment to the actual should also, in certain circum-
stances, justify having negative attitudes toward outcomes that are in our prudential interest.
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art they planned to see. As a result, creating and appreciating art became a central
part of their lives. After years of planning, they ﬁnally make it to France. Unfortu-
nately, the Louvre burns down the night before they are able to ﬁrst visit it.
The Griswolds rightly lament this outcome. They also begin to research other
things to do in France. They end up ﬁlling their days with bike tours, visits to the
Eiffel Tower, the Palace of Versailles, the Luxembourg Gardens, and various other
outings. Although they previously had no interest in any of these activities, each ac-
tivity brings them joy and is fulﬁlling in its own way. In the end, the Griswolds had a
better vacation than they expected. As a matter of fact, they had a better vacation
than they would have had if the Louvre had not burned down.
The following seems to be true of Vacation Adversity. It is appropriate for the
Griswolds to have a non-trivial negative attitude toward the time they wasted prepar-
ing for their visit to the Louvre, toward being deprived of the good of seeing the art in
the Louvre, and toward the fact that many people were made worse off as a result of
the Louvre being destroyed. Still, the fact that the Louvre burned down was, all
things considered, good for the Griswolds since it resulted in them having a better
vacation than they would have otherwise had. This is so even though the Griswolds
could have always taken the better vacation (i.e. the one they ended up taking). The
fact that theywouldn’t have taken the better vacation unless the Louvre burned down
sufﬁces for it to be good for them that the Louvre burned down.26 Since the trip was
better than they reasonably expected, the Griswolds ought to also have a non-trivial
positive attitude toward their vacation. In this section, I will argue that similar judg-
ments could be warranted in a Doomsday or Infertility scenario.
4.2. Why Doomsday is not necessarily bad for you
If the lack of a collective afterlife is necessarily bad, all things considered, for a per-
son, it must not simply render the person’s life less valuable. It must also preclude the
possibility of adopting new projects that are valuable enough to compensate for the
loss of pro tanto value caused by the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios. Compen-
sation occurs if the new projects one adopts in light of learning that there is no col-
lective afterlife end up making a person’s life at least as valuable as she reasonably
believed it would be prior to learning there is no collective afterlife. For example,
a young cancer researcher may reasonably believe, at t1, that the total value of her
life will end up being n. Suppose that at t2 she learns that she is in an Infertility
26 To illustrate, imagine that I am trying to decide between having chocolate or vanilla vegan
ice cream for dessert. Suppose that I decide to have the chocolate ice cream, though (unbeknownst to
me) I would enjoy the vanilla ice cream more. As it turns out, however, I am unable to have the choc-
olate ice cream because I accidently knock it on the ground when I reach for it. I end up having the va-
nilla ice cream, which was best all along. Knocking the chocolate ice cream to the ground was good for
me because it resulted in me having the better dessert. This is true even though I could have chosen
vanilla all along.
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scenario. This information reveals that her cancer research is less valuable than she
justiﬁably believed it to be at t1. Consequently, her cancer research will not contrib-
ute to the value of her life to the extent that, at t1, she thought it would. Now, com-
pensation occurs if this person adopts new projects that cause the total value of her
life to still be ≥ n. We can state this idea more formally as follows.
The Compensation Principle (CP): The lack of a collective afterlife is necessarily
bad, all things considered, for a person P iff it prevents P from having the ability to
engage in projects that are sufﬁciently valuable to compensate for the loss of pro
tanto value in P’s life caused by the lack of a collective afterlife.
I am going to argue that it is a viable possibility that there would be no shortage
of compensating projects available to most people in a Doomsday or Infertility
scenario. Call this claim the Compensation Thesis (CT). CP and CT jointly entail
that the lack of a collective afterlife need not be bad, all things considered, for
most people. To be clear, this leaves open the possibility that many people would
not take up compensating projects were they to learn there is no collective after-
life. The Doomsday and Infertility scenarios would then be bad, all things consid-
ered, for these people. The crucial point is that they needn’t be.
One more clariﬁcatory point is in order. WhetherCT is true in a particularDooms-
day or Infertility scenario depends on certain other details in the case. Compensation
would not be possible if the very conditions for living valuable lives were
undermined. If, for instance, the world descends into a post-apocalyptic nightmare,
then I grant that compensation would eventually become impossible to obtain. The
number of compensating projects available would also signiﬁcantly decrease as
the number of sentient creatures on earth decreases. People’s epistemic state matters
as well. For instance, people could not engage in compensating projects if they only
ﬁnd out that they are in aDoomsday scenario immediately before they die. In light of
these considerations, I’ll restrict the remainder of my discussion to Doomsday and
Infertility scenarios where the majority of people have many years of life left to live
at the time they discover there is no collective afterlife and where there are as many
people on earth at the time of discovery as there are presently. I am now going to
provide four defeasible considerations in favor of CT under these conditions.
4.3. In favor of the Compensation Thesis
First, the lack of a collective afterlife would have a smaller impact on the value of
most people’s lives than Schefﬂer’s imagined reactions seem to suggest. The
Doomsday and Infertility scenarios pose the largest threat for those primarily en-
gaged in future-oriented projects, but most people do not seem to be primarily en-
gaged in such projects. Careers in ﬁelds such as environmental conservation and
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medical research aimed at curing disease are much rarer than careers aimed, ﬁrst
and foremost, at beneﬁting existing people. In fact, the most common jobs in ev-
ery income bracket appear to be exclusively present-oriented projects.27 So, if
most people are not primarily engaged in future-oriented projects, then the value
of most people’s lives should not be severely threatened by MP.
These considerations are far from decisive. It could very well be the case that most
people are engaged in a future-oriented project of one kind of another outside of their
careers. Such projects may give people’s life a great deal of value, even if they only
occupy a small portion of people’s time. I’m skeptical that most people do engage in
such valuable future-oriented projects, but I can allow for this possibility and still
argue that CT is a viable option in light of the considerations I raise in this section.
Second, the lack of a collective afterlife could make available meaningful pro-
jects that would not otherwise exist. If Schefﬂer’s speculations are accurate, the
need for therapists would dramatically increase were people to learn that there is
no collective afterlife. Relatedly, there would be a need for a new kind of career
advisor: one that could place people in a new career that will be most valued by
their future thick self, but perhaps is related in certain important respects to one’s
present thick self. Adoption rates would probably increase in an Infertility sce-
nario, requiring a greater workforce to put children in the best possible homes.
People could very well become more preoccupied with extending their own life,
giving rise to an increased demand for life-extending products. Less egoistically,
as Susan Wolf argues, people could recognize that “they are all in this together”
and may ﬁnd a sense of solidarity with people they would not otherwise have
known.28 These, and other new, meaningful projects made possible by the lack
of a collective afterlife, could all help serve compensation.
Third, along the same lines, the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios would re-
move the moral reasons we have to make certain sacriﬁces that many of us are,
at least to some extent, making. This would allow existing persons to partake in
certain welfare-enhancing activities they otherwise would not. In a Doomsday
or Infertility scenario, there would be no moral reason to be environmentally con-
scious, to consider population changes (e.g. increasing urbanization, changing in-
come levels, common social aspirations) in infrastructure planning, to reduce
reliance on non-renewable resources or to set up ﬁnancial trusts for future family
27 For some information about the most common jobs by income bracket in the United States,
see http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2014/10/16/356176018/the-most-popular-jobs-for-the-rich-mid-
dle-class-and-poor
28 See Wolf (2013, §2). Wolf also argues that people would be motivated to help those that are
near and dear to them (p. 121). This is a different issue from the ones I raise in this section since Wolf’s
claim is neutral with respect to whether the majority of people are primarily engaged in future-oriented
projects. Nor does Wolf (or anyone) argue that compensation may occur in Doomsday and Infertility
scenarios.
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members. People could, for instance, drive whenever and wherever they desired in
inefﬁcient gas-guzzling vehicles, eat food imported from around the world, use
non-biodegradable environmentally disastrous products whenever it is convenient
and build golf courses and parks that use an inordinate amount of water.29 Those
with the ﬁnancial resources could vacation frequently in exotic faraway places in
private jets. Succinctly put, people would be free to use the remainder of earth’s
resources to maximize their comfort. Such activities would not necessarily make
anyone’s life more meaningful, but it would increase their well-being.
Fourth, and most importantly, there is an overabundance of valuable projects
currently available to people which would seemingly remain available in a
Doomsday or Infertility scenario. These projects help ensure that compensation
would be attainable for most everyone. The project of ﬁghting global poverty is
a prime example. Over a billion people live in extreme poverty and more than
80% of people live on less than $10 a day.30 They suffer immensely and unneces-
sarily. Those who live in extreme poverty die prematurely from lack of food, wa-
ter, and proper medical care. They are denied a proper education and lack access
to substantial cultural goods (e.g. the internet). They are deprived of the opportu-
nity to experience great works of art, literature, ﬁlm, poetry and miss out on intel-
lectual pursuits, like engaging in philosophical inquiry. A signiﬁcantly greater
amount of good could be done if just a fraction of the ﬁnancial resources currently
used on future-oriented projects were instead used to combat extreme poverty.31
Consider Schefﬂer’s cancer example again. Finding a cure for any type of cancer
is a long, arduous, and uncertain process. Almost everyone engaged in a cancer-
curing project will, at most, only make a minor contribution to its success. Even
those who do manage to contribute to its success are likely not making a necessary
contribution to ﬁnding the cure. This is because there is not a shortage of qualiﬁed
scientists willing to partake in cancer research. If one cancer researcher quit her job
to work at The Humane League, her position would likely be ﬁlled by someone else
that would make a comparable contribution to cancer research.
Jobs at non-proﬁts may be quickly ﬁlled as well, but a (perhaps even better) al-
ternative would be to take a high paying job and earning to give to the most effec-
tive charities. The most effective charities still lack the ﬁnancial resources
necessary to do the most good possible. Anyone with even a moderate expendable
income can literally save hundreds of lives by adopting certain charitable practices
that combat global poverty. Since there is a shortage of people willing to invest
29 Wolf brieﬂy alludes to this possibility (Wolf 2013, 122, fn 8).
30 This means that they live on less than $1.25 a day. More than 3 billion people live on less
than $3 a day and more than 80% of humans live on less than $10 a day. For more on this, see The
World Bank’s data on global poverty at www.worldbank.org.
31 See Singer (2009, chs 6 and 7; 2015) for arguments that support this claim.
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their time and resources in combating global poverty, people who adopt this pro-
ject can ensure that hundreds of children live to adulthood who would have other-
wise died. This is one sense in which the project of combating global poverty is
more valuable than engaging in cancer research. What matters is not just being
a part of a process that leads to some good. Being a difference-maker with respect
to the time and degree to which some good is achieved also matters.
People can also do more good by joining Doctors Without Borders, The Hu-
mane League, volunteering at homeless shelters, animal shelters, providing educa-
tional resources to the underprivileged or undertaking any, even roughly,
comparably good project. There are very few, if any, future-oriented projects cur-
rently available where one can reasonably expect to be personally responsible for
saving hundreds of lives. But there is a plethora of present-oriented projects com-
batting global poverty that would allow those involved to do just that. There is
also compelling empirical evidence that undertaking such charitable projects
would noticeably increase people’s total well-being.32 The amount of expected
good of future-oriented projects is far less than the amount of expected good of
(certain) present-oriented projects.33 Schefﬂer has expressed skepticism that peo-
ple would engage in alternatively comparably meaningful projects, which is essen-
tial to maintaining his claim that Doomsday and Infertility scenarios would be bad
for people. Again, I am not taking a stand on how people would react, but instead
on how they ought to react in such situations. The prudent (and moral) courses of
action involve actively seeking out compensating projects that beneﬁt existing
people.34 Even if global poverty were completely eradicated, so long as some
people are not as well-off as possible, there would be meaningful present-oriented
projects available. These considerations provide good reason to think that CT is a
viable option in many Doomsday and Infertility scenarios.
5. Conclusion
Schefﬂer has accomplished a rare feat withDeath and the Afterlife. He uncovered a
fruitful new area of philosophical inquiry and, in just a few hundred pages, made
signiﬁcant advancements toward answering the questions raised by his Doomsday
and Infertility thought experiments. In this paper, I have been concerned with
32 See Singer (2015, ch. 9).
33 This is especially true if the value of beneﬁting morally considerable beings is proportional
to the rarity of morally considerable beings. For some discussion on rarity and cosmic signiﬁcance, see
Kahane (2014).
34 It may also involve ensuring that there is a ‘Good Ending’ to human civilization. For dis-
cussion, see Johansson (2015).
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questions about how we ought to react to the Doomsday and Infertility scenarios. I
ﬁrst argued it would be appropriate to lament each of these outcomes to some de-
gree for two reasons heretofore overlooked. First, the lack of a collective afterlife
entails that the world is worse from the point of view of the universe than we rea-
sonably expected. Second, most people believe that there will be a long collective
afterlife and structure their life around this belief. This means that one will have to
make radical changes to her thick self if she is going to live a life just as valuable as
she reasonably expected prior to learning there is no collective afterlife.
I then argued that in spite of these reasons to lament the Doomsday and
Infertility scenarios, they need not be, all things considered, bad for any existing
person. At least, I gave four reasons to think this is a viable option. If my
arguments are successful, they preserve the initial judgment that the Doomsday
and Infertility scenarios warrant lament, yet seriously challenge the assumption
that the possibility of leading lives as valuable as we expect depends upon the
existence of a long collective afterlife.*
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